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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have shown that attackers can force deep learning
models to misclassify so-called “adversarial examples:” maliciously
generated images formed by making imperceptible modifications
to pixel values. With growing interest in deep learning for security
applications, it is important for security experts and users of ma-
chine learning to recognize how learning systems may be attacked.
Due to the complex nature of deep learning, it is challenging to
understand how deep models can be fooled by adversarial examples.
Thus, we present a web-based visualization tool, ADVERSARIAL-
PLAYGROUND, to demonstrate the efficacy of common adversar-
ial methods against a convolutional neural network (CNN) system.
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND is educational, modular and interac-
tive. (1) It enables non-experts to compare examples visually and to
understand why an adversarial example can fool a CNN-based image
classifier. (2) It can help security experts explore more vulnerability
of deep learning as a software module. (3) Building an interactive
visualization is challenging in this domain due to the large feature
space of image classification (generating adversarial examples is
slow in general and visualizing images are costly). Through mul-
tiple novel design choices, our tool can provide fast and accurate
responses to user requests. Empirically, we find that our client-server
division strategy reduced the response time by an average of 1.5
seconds per sample. Our other innovation, a faster variant of JSMA
evasion algorithm, empirically performed twice as fast as JSMA and
yet maintains a comparable evasion rate1.
Index Terms: I.2.6 [Artificial Intelligence]: Learning—
Connectionism and neural nets; K.6.5 [Management of Computing
and Information Systems]: Security and Protection—Unauthorized
access
1 INTRODUCTION
Investigating the behavior of machine learning systems in adversarial
environments is an emerging topic at the junction of computer secu-
rity and machine learning [1]. While machine learning models may
appear to be effective for many security tasks like malware classifi-
cation [7] and facial recognition [9], these classification techniques
were not designed to withstand manipulations made by intelligent
and adaptive adversaries. In contrast with applications of machine
learning to other fields, security tasks involve adversaries that may
respond maliciously to the classifier [1].
Recent studies show that intelligent attackers can force machine
learning systems to misclassify samples by performing nearly im-
perceptible modifications to the sample before attempting classi-
fication [4, 10]. These samples, named as “adversarial examples,”
have effectively fooled many state-of-the-art deep learning models.
*e-mail: apn4za@virginia.edu
†e-mail: yanjun@virginia.edu
1Project source code and data from our experiments available at: https:
//github.com/QData/AdversarialDNN-Playground.
Adversarial examples for Deep Neural Network (DNN) models are
usually crafted through an optimization procedure that searches for
small, yet effective, perturbations of the original image (details in
Sect. 2). Understanding why a DNN model performs as it does is
quite challenging, and even moreso to understand how such a model
can be fooled by adversarial examples.
With growing interest in adversarial deep learning, it is important
for security experts and users of DNN systems to understand how
DNN models may be attacked in face of an adversary. This paper
introduces a visualization tool, ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND, to
enable better understanding of how different types of adversarial
examples fool DNN systems. ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND pro-
vides a simple and intuitive interface to let users visually explore
the impact of three attack algorithms that generate adversarial ex-
amples. Users may specify parameters for a variety of attack types
and generate new samples on-demand. The interface displays the
resulting adversarial example compared to the original alongside
classification likelihoods on both images from the DNN.
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND provides the following benefits:
• Educational: Fig. 1 shows a screen-shot of the visualization.
This intuitive and simple visualization helps practitioners of
deep learning to understand how their models misclassify and
how adversarial examples by various algorithm differ.
• Interactive: We add two novel strategies in ADVERSARIAL-
PLAYGROUND to make it respond to users’ requests in a suffi-
ciently quick manner. The interactive visualization allow users
to gain deeper intuition about the behavior of DNN classifica-
tion through maliciously generated inputs.
• Modular: Security experts can easily plug ADVERSARIAL-
PLAYGROUND into their benchmarking frameworks as a mod-
ule. The design also allows experts to easily add other DNN
models or more algorithms of generating adversarial examples
in the visualization.
To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first visualization platform
showing how adversarial examples are generated and how they fool
a DNN system.
The rest of this paper takes the following structure: Sect. 2 dis-
cusses the relevant backgrounds, Sect. 3 introduces the system or-
ganization and software design of ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND,
Sect. 4 presents an empirical evaluation with respect to different de-
sign choices, and Sect. 5 concludes the paper by discussing possible
extensions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Adversarial Examples and More
Studies regarding the behavior of machine learning models in adver-
sarial environments generally fall into one of three categories: (1)
poisoning attacks, in which specially crafted samples are injected
into the training of a learning model, (2) privacy-aware learning,
which aim to preserve the privacy of information in data samples,
or (3) evasion attacks, in which the adversary aims to create inputs
that are misclassified by a target classifier. Generating adversarial
examples is part of this last category.
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Figure 1: ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND User Interface
The goal of adversarial example generation is to craft an input for
a particular classifier that, while improperly classified, reveals only
slight alteration on the input. To formalize the extent of allowed
alterations, evasion algorithms minimize the difference between
the “seed” input and the resulting adversarial example based on a
predefined norm (a function measuring the distance between two
inputs).
In some cases, the adversary specifies the “target” class of an
adversarial sample — for example, the adversary may desire an
image that looks like a “6” to be classified as a “5” (as in Fig. 1).
This is referred to as a targeted attack. Conversely, if the adversary
does not specify the desired class, the algorithm is considered to be
untargeted.
Formally, let us denote f : X → C to be a classifier that maps
the set of all possible inputs, X , to a finite set of classes, C. Then,
given a target class yt ∈C, a seed sample x ∈ X , and a norm function
‖ · ‖, the goal of generating a targeted adversarial example is to find
x′ ∈ X such that:
x′ = argmin
s∈X
{‖x− s‖ : f (s) = yt} (1)
Similarly, in the untargeted case, the goal is to find x′ such that:
x′ = argmin
s∈X
{‖x− s‖ : f (s) 6= f (x)} (2)
In this formalization, we see there are two key degrees of free-
dom in creating a new evasion algorithm: targeted vs. untar-
geted attacks and the choice of norm functions. The latter cat-
egory provides a useful grouping scheme for algorithms gener-
ating adversarial inputs, suggested by Carlini and Wagner [2].
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND uses two evasion algorithms pro-
vided by the cleverhans library [3]: the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) based on the L∞ norm, and the Jacobian Saliency Map Ap-
proach (JSMA) based on the L0 norm [8].
2.2 DNNs and the MNIST Dataset
DNNs can efficiently learn highly-accurate models in many domains
[5, 7]. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), first popularized by
LeCun et al. [6], perform exceptionally well on image classification.
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND uses a state-of-the-art CNN model
on the popular MNIST “handwritten digits” dataset for visualizing
evasion attacks. This dataset contains 70,000 images of hand-written
digits (0 through 9). Of these, 60,000 images are used as training
data and the remaining 10,000 images are used for testing. Each
sample is a 28×28 pixel, 8-bit grayscale image. Users of our system
are presented with a collection of seed images, selected from each
of the 10 classes in the testing set (see the right side of Fig. 1).
2.3 TensorFlow Playground
Our proposed package follows the spirit of TensorFlow Playground
— a web-based educational tool that helps users understand how
neural networks work [11]. TensorFlow Playground has been used
in many classes as a pedagogical aid and helps the self-guided
student learn more. Its impact inspires us to visualize adversarial
examples through ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND. Our web-based
visualization tool assists users in understanding and comparing the
impact of standard evasion techniques on deep learning models.
3 ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND: A MODULAR AND INTER-
ACTIVE VISUALIZATION SUITE
In creating our system, we made several design decisions to make
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND educational, modular and interac-
tive. Here, we present the four major system-level decisions we
made: (1) building ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND as a web-based
application, (2) utilizing both client- and server-side code, (3) ren-
dering images with the client rather than the server and (4) imple-
menting a faster variation of JSMA attack.
We released all project code on GitHub in the interest of providing
a high-quality, easy-to-use software package to demonstrate how
adversarial examples fool deep learning.
3.1 A Web-based Visualization Interface
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND provides quick and effective visu-
alizations of adversarial examples through an interactive webapp
as shown by Fig. 1. The user selects one attacking algorithm from
the navigation bar at the top of the webapp. On the right-hand pane,
the user sets the attacking strength the algorithm using the slider,
selects a seed image, and (if applicable) a target class. (Fig. 1 at
right.) Selecting a seed image immediately loads the image to the
left-hand display and displays the output of the CNN classifier in a
bar chart below.
After setting the parameters, the user clicks “Generate Adversarial
Sample.” This runs the chosen adversarial algorithm in real-time to
attempt generating an adversarial sample. The sample is displayed
in the primary pane to the left of the controls (Fig. 1 at center). The
generated sample is fed through the CNN classifier, and then the
likelihoods are displayed in a bar chart below the sample. Finally,
the classification of generated sample is displayed below the controls
at right.
This web-based visualization generates adversarial examples “on-
demand” from user-specified parameters. Therefore users can see
the impact of different adversarial algorithms with varying configu-
rations.
Developing ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND as a web-based (as
opposed to a local) application enables a large number of users to
utilize the application without requiring an installation process on
each computer. By eliminating an installation step, we encourage
potential users who may be only casually interested in adversarial
machine learning to explore what it is. This supports the pedagogical
goals of the software package.
3.2 A Modular Design with Client-Server Division
Two key features of ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND are its modular
design and the division of the functionality between the client and
server; the client handles user interaction and visualization, while
the server handles more computationally intensive tasks. Fig. 2
diagrams the interaction between each component of our system. At
the upper right, we have the user who may specify hyperparameters
for the evasion algorithm. Moving counter-clockwise, these parame-
ters are transferred to the server, where the appropriate adversarial
algorithm module is selected and run against the pre-trained CNN
module. TensorFlow is used to reduce computation time and im-
prove compatibility. Finally, the resulting sample is sent to the client
and plotted using the JavaScript library Plotly.JS.
Figure 2: ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND System Sketch
Users running a local copy of the webapp may easily customize
the tool to their needs; by separating the deep learning model and
the evasion methods from the main visualization and interface code-
base, changing or adding DNN models or adding new adversarial
algorithms is straightforward.
TensorFlow based Server-side: Our inspiration, the Tensor-
Flow Playground, was written entirely in JavaScript and other client-
side technologies, allowing a lightweight server to host the service
for many users. Unfortunately, adversarial examples are usually
generated on larger, deeper networks than those created by users of
TensorFlow Playground, and this makes a JavaScript-only approach
prohibitively slow.
Instead, we chose to use a GPU-enabled server running Python
with TensorFlow to generate the adversarial examples on the back-
end (server-side), then send the image data to the client. This pro-
vides increased speed (aiding interactivity), adds compatibility with
other TensorFlow-based deep learning models and allows the flexi-
bility of evasion algorithms (promoting modularity).
Server-side Configuration: The server-side of ADVERSARIAL-
PLAYGROUND requires a computer with Python 3.5, TensorFlow
1.0 (or higher), the standard SciPy stack, and the Python package
Flask. We have tested the code on Windows, Linux, and Mac
operating systems.
To install, clone the GitHub repository and install the prerequi-
sites via pip3 -r install requirements.txt. A pre-trained
MNIST model is already stored in the GitHub repository; all that
is needed to start the webapp is to run python3 run.py. Once the
app is started, it will run on localhost:9000.
3.3 Visualizing Sample through Client-side Rendering
As shown in Fig. 2, through the client, the user adjusts hyperpa-
rameters and submits a request to generate an adversarial sample to
the server. Once the TensorFlow back-end generates the adversarial
image and classification likelihoods, the server returns this data to
the client. Finally, this information is displayed graphically to the
user through use of the Plotly JavaScript library.
As we generate adversarial samples on the server-side, it was
tempting to produce the output images on the server as well. In
our prototype, we used server-side rendering of these images with
the Python library matplotlib, then downloaded the image for
display on the client. However, we ultimately decided to assign all
visualization tasks to the client, using JavaScript and the Plotly.JS
library, after realizing this approach was faster.
This is because generating images on the server with the default
matplotlib utilities required creating a full PNG image, writing
it to disk, then transferring the image to the client; this took time
and increased latency. Fortunately, client-side rendering of images
required transmission of far less data; only pixel values for the 28×
28 MNIST images and the 10 values for classification likelihoods
needed to be sent. Additionally, the Plotly.JS library provided
interactive plots that enable users to view the underlying values
for each pixel. Empirically, switching to a client-side rendering
of images reduced response time by approximately 1.5 seconds.
(Sect. 4.2.)
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND’s modularity extends into the vi-
sualization code, too. Although it may be hosted on any machine
that supports TensorFlow, the web-based client/server division of
the webapp allows the computationally intensive “back-end” to be
hosted on a powerful server while the visualizations may be accessed
from any device.
3.4 Faster Variant of JSMA Attack
While dividing the computation and visualization steps between the
client and server saved some time, actually generating the adver-
sarial example is where the most time is consumed (Table 1). In
particular, the Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) algorithm
by Papernot et al. [8] can take more than two-thirds of a second to
generate a single adversarial output. In order to provide an inter-
active experience, our web app must generate adversarial samples
quickly. We therefore introduce a new, faster variant of the JSMA
that maintains a comparable evasion rate to the original, but can take
half as much time.
JSMA Background: Most state-of-the-art evasion algorithms
are slow due to the expensive optimization and the large search space
involved in image classification [2, 3].
The original JSMA algorithm is a targeted attack that uses the L0
norm in Equation 1. To generate x′ from x, JSMA iteratively selects
the “most influential” combination of two features to alter. To rank
features by their influence, JSMA uses a saliency map of the forward
derivative of the classifier. The ranking and alteration process is
repeated until the altered sample is successfully classified as yt or
the L0 distance between the altered and seed samples exceeds a
provided threshold, ϒ.
The largest consumption of time in JSAM is the combinatorial
search over all feature pairs to determine the “best” pair to alter; if
there are M features in a given sample, JSMA must evaluate Θ(M2)
candidates at each iteration. When working on high-dimensional
data, this can become prohibitively expensive. We introduce a new,
faster variant of JSMA that maintains a comparable evasion rate
to the original, which we call Fast Jacobian Saliency Map Apriori
(FJSMA).
FJSMA Improvement: Our FJSMA approach is an approxima-
tion of JSMA that uses an a priori heuristic to significantly reduce
the search space. Instead of considering all pairs of features (p,q),
our improvement only considers such pairs where p is in the top k
features when ranked by the derivative in the p-coordinate, where
k is a small constant. (See red-bolded modifications to JSMA in
Algorithm 1.)
If we denote the set consisting of the top k elements in A as ranked
by f by arg topx∈A ( f (x); k), then the loop in our Fast Jacobian
Saliency Map Apriori (FJSMA) selection routine is Θ(k · |Γ|), where
k |Γ| and |Γ|=M is the size of the feature set. Since determining
the top k features can be done in linear time, this is considerable
improvement in asymptotic terms.
This modification improves the runtime from Θ(M2) to Θ(M · k),
where M is the feature size and k is some small constant. Our
experiments show k may be as little as 15% of M and still maintain
the same efficacy in terms of evasion rate as JSMA.
4 PERFORMANCE TESTING
We conducted a series of timing tests to quantify how our de-
sign choices have influenced the speed of interactive responses by
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND. First, we consider the impact of
relegating the visualization code to the client (from Sect. 3.2); then,
Algorithm 1 Fast Jacobian Saliency Map Apriori Selection
∇F(X) is the forward derivative, Γ the features still in the search
space, t the target class, and k is a small constant
Input: ∇F(X), Γ, t, k
1: K = arg topp∈Γ
(
− ∂Ft (X)∂Xp ; k
)
. Changed for FJSMA
2: for each pair (p,q) ∈ K×Γ, p 6= q do . Changed for FJSMA
3: α = ∑i=p,q
∂Ft (X)
∂Xi
4: β = ∑i=p,q∑ j 6=t
∂F j(X)
∂Xi
5: if α < 0 and β > 0 and −α×β > max then
6: p1, p2← p,q
7: max←−α×β
8: end if
9: end for
10: return p1, p2
we show that FJSMA is faster and just as accurate as the JSMA
implementation by cleverhans package.
4.1 Client-side Rendering Improves Response Speed
Rendering done on... Server Image Download Total
Server-side 4472 350 4821
Client-side 3335 — 3335
Difference 1137 350 1486
Table 1: Latency with and without client-side visualization. A time
profiling of the latency experienced by the user when 1) the server handled
all computation and visualization and 2) the visualization was offloaded to
the client. The “Server” column denotes time taken for the server to respond,
while the “Image Download” column shows the additional time taken to
transfer each image (only applicable for server-side rendering).
We first conducted timing tests to evaluate how the choice of
client-side rendering (Sect. 3.2) has influenced the speed of respond-
ing to users’ requests. We loaded the webapp and measured the
response time of the server for a variety of seed images and tar-
get classes. We repeated these for a total of between 10 and 16
times (depending on the algorithm), averaged the response time, and
reported the result in Table 1. The majority of the time for both
with and without client-side visualization is in the server compu-
tation. However, offloading the visualization to the client resulted
in a nearly 1.5-second speedup (an approximately 30% difference).
Interestingly, not only did the image download time get eliminated,
but the server computation time was reduced as well. This is, in part,
due to the reduction of I/O operations and image generation required
by the server when visualization is done by the client.
4.2 FJSMA Improvement
We propose a faster approximation of the JSMA attacking algo-
rithm: FJSMA in Sect. 3.4. Using the same CNN model we used
in ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND for the MNIST dataset, we com-
pared FJSMA with JSMA through two metrics: (1) the “wall clock”
time needed for successfully generating an adversarial example, and
(2) the evasion rate — a standard metric that reports the percentage
of seed images that were successfully converted into adversarial
samples.
This comparison was conducted in a batch manner. We ran both
evasion attacks on the 10000-sample MNIST testing set for a range
of values of the ϒ parameter for both algorithms. For FJSMA, we
also varied the value of input parameter k (the percentage of the
feature-set size). Intuitively, this k value is a control on how tight of
an approximation FJSMA is to JSMA; as k grows larger, we should
ϒ 10% 15% 20% 25%
JSMA Evasion Rate 0.658 0.824 0.867 0.879
FJSMA Evasion Rate [k = 10%] 0.583 0.777 0.823 0.826
FJSMA Evasion Rate [k = 15%] 0.613 0.816 0.867 0.871
FJSMA Evasion Rate [k = 20%] 0.633 0.833 0.878 0.887
FJSMA Evasion Rate [k = 30%] 0.638 0.844 0.896 0.901
JSMA Time (s) 0.606 0.745 0.807 0.803
FJSMA Time [k = 10%] (s) 0.411 0.468 0.490 0.485
FJSMA Time [k = 15%] (s) 0.414 0.473 0.483 0.484
FJSMA Time [k = 20%] (s) 0.415 0.466 0.482 0.483
FJSMA Time [k = 30%] (s) 0.415 0.464 0.490 0.485
Table 2: JSMA and FJSMA Comparison. Each column represents a
test run with a particular value of ϒ (the maximum allowed perturbation for
a sample). The top half of the table provides the average evasion rate for
each algorithm, while the bottom half provides the average time (in seconds)
that it took to generate an adversarial example. The FJSMA algorithm was
run with multiple values of k, where k was 10%,15%,20%, and 30% of the
feature space size.
expect the performance of the two approaches to converge to each
other.
Results of this experiment are summarized in Table 2. The
cleverhans JSMA and the proposed FJSMA attack achieve similar
evasion rates for all tested values of ϒ and k, with larger values of
k increasing the evasion rate. Curiously, for k ≥ 20%, our imple-
mentation of FJSMA even outperforms that of cleverhans JSMA;
this is likely due to implementation details. The average time to
form an evasive sample from a seed benign sample is given in the
second half of the table. Our FJSMA approach greatly improves
upon the speed of JSMA. However, varying the value of k does not
produce a significant variation in runtime per sample; we conjecture
this is because of the small feature space of MNIST and that search-
ing 30% of the feature space likely does not dominate the runtime.
In summary, FJSMA achieves a significant improvement in speed,
while maintaining essentially the same evasion rate — an important
advantage for interactive visualization.
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The study of evasion attacks on machine learning models is a
rapidly growing field. In this paper, we present a web-based tool
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND for visualizing the performance of
adversarial examples against deep neural networks. ADVERSARIAL-
PLAYGROUND enables non-experts to compare adversarial examples
visually and can help security experts explore more vulnerability of
deep learning. It is modular and interactive. To our knowledge, our
platform is the first visualization-focused package for adversarial
machine learning.
A straightforward extension of this work is to increase the vari-
ety of supported evasion methods. For example, including the new
attacks based on L0, L2, and L∞ norms from Carlini and Wagner’s
recent paper [2] would be a good next step in comparing the perfor-
mance of multiple evasion strategies. However, expansion in this
manner presents an additional issue of latency. To generate evading
samples “on-demand,” the adversarial algorithm must run quickly;
these other algorithms take much longer to execute than those we
selected, so some time-saving techniques must be explored.
Another direction for development is to provide more choices of
classifiers and datasets. Allowing the user to select from CIFAR,
ImageNet, and MNIST data would highlight the similarities and
differences between how a single attack method deals with differ-
ent data. Similarly, providing the user with a choice of multiple
pre-trained models — possibly hardened against attack through ad-
versarial training — would help distinguish artifacts of model choice
from the behavior of the attack. These two extensions would help
users more fully understand the behavior of an adversarial algorithm.
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